War in the Niger-Delta

Last year I wrote “The Trouble In The Niger-Delta” in which I argued basically that a “three-track strategy” consisting of a “sincere and constructive discussion and engagement between all stakeholders (federal, state and local governments, community and civic associations, oil companies, NDDC, youth groups, media, donor agencies, etc) to achieve consensus on the region’s development”; a “massive and immediate infrastructural investment in the region-roads and bridges, railways, hospitals, urban renewal and new cities development, primary and secondary education, micro-finance institutions, as well as skills acquisition and youth and vocational centres” and “the third track-military and intelligence capacity building and strict and decisive law enforcement and security action” would be required to solve the problems in the region.

Essentially there are legitimate grievances in the Niger-Delta which had been identified as far back as the Willinks Commission Report of 1957. These have manifested in different forms-the insurrection of Isaac Adaka Boro during the first republic, the agitation for the creation of the COR (Calabar, Ogoja, Rivers) state; the Ogoni Campaign led by Ken Saro Wiwa and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People; the large presence of Niger-Delta indigenes in the Orkar Coup in 1990; grumblings over environmental degradation and development which led to creation of OMPADEC and NDDC; the resource control argument etc. Unfortunately since the advent of the current republic, these legitimate grievances have become subsumed within a movement that manifests more as criminality, political violence, oil theft, kidnapping for ransom and general lawlessness, and has detracted from the genuine complaints of the Niger-Delta people.

This derailment was traceable to the visionless political leaders in the region beginning from the run up to the 1999 elections and afterwards who deployed the strong arm tactics of the militant groups to secure their “election” into office and who afterwards paid them hefty sums of money to maintain their loyalty. Alternatively these leaders looked the other way while their erstwhile henchmen took over territory, engaged in kidnapping or oil “bunkering” or other forms of criminal extortion and brigandage, thus discrediting the campaign for development in the region. The large scale corruption within the political class meant that the governors and legislators had no moral authority to restrain this descent to criminality. It also meant that the region’s call for “resource control” and a higher derivation rang hollow in the ears of other Nigerians.

To be fair, the lack of visionary leadership since 1999, and corruption and loss of moral authority was not restricted to the Niger-Delta-it was a pan-Nigerian problem. Northern leaders for instance could equally be asked why in spite of their near-total control of state power since independence; the region has the highest poverty and illiteracy rate in Nigeria. In the East, men had largely abandoned education for trading and in Yoruba land the office where Awolowo once sat is now occupied by Alao-Akala! In short the leadership failure in the Niger-Delta is replicated across the Nigerian State so none of us is justified in casting the first stone. But the consequences were going to be worse in the Niger-Delta which alone had the right to feel that Nigeria was maintained by resources extracted from their region while they lived with the environmental and social consequences.

In the earlier article referred to above, my point was that only simultaneous attention to the fundamental causes-underdevelopment, dialogue around our federalism-as well as dealing with crime and law enforcement could provide a sustainable long term solution to the problem in the region. In effect with the current military operations, the Nigerian state has chosen a military solution by and large. The government’s initial actions of creation of a Niger-Delta Ministry, the Niger-Delta Technical Committee and the offer of amnesty all suggested an intent to proceed with such a multiple approach but the government has evidently shown more commitment to the pacification of the region, rather than the other approaches.

The leadership of the Niger-Delta, particularly the Ijaw ethnic group, must now recognise that they have committed significant strategic errors. It could not have been in their interest to precipitate a military confrontation with the Nigerian state; they allowed the actions of the “militants” to alienate many domestic and international observers; and like Sadaam Hussein continued to threaten a “mother of all wars” which has now provided an alibi for military action. The type of intellectual and political militancy required was almost completely absent in effect ceding the leadership of the Niger-Delta “struggle” to miscreants and gangsters whose motives were largely commercial. It is time for them to re-evaluate their strategy.

The Nigerian state will also need to evaluate its own strategy. Military action will end the criminality (at least for a season) but if the political undercurrents and development of the region are not attended to, the next blow-up may even be worse as we have seen from history. Beyond the Niger-Delta, there are issues from other regions-Sharia, fiscal federalism, MASSOB, federal character-all of which suggest that a honest debate about the structure of our federalism is still necessary.