Ojukwu and Nigerian Federalism (3)

With failure of the majors’ coup, and Major-General Ironsi prevailing, Nigeria entered military rule with Ironsi as Head of State. Nzeogwu expressed regrets that tribal considerations subverted the coup which in his words “failed because of incompetence and misguided considerations” of the Southern contingent. Ironsi was ill-prepared and ill-suited intellectually and administratively for national leadership, displaying serial mis-judgments culminating in the counter-coup which terminated his regime and life in July 1966. The final spark was the unification decree-Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No 34 of 1966-which sought to abolish the four regions, convert them into “groups of provinces” and unify public services under a single Public Service Commission. The decree engendered strong objection from the North-Northern civil servants staged public demonstrations and Northern Emirs reportedly sent Ironsi a secret memorandum demanding abrogation of the contentious decree or secession. In May 1966, riots and a bloodbath erupted in the North with at least 3,000 Easterners killed, and others fleeing South. How did Ojukwu, who had become Governor of the Eastern Region since January 1966, react? He pleaded with Igbos to return up North and in June 1966, barely a month after the massacre, he appointed his old friend, Emir of Kano, Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka! These couldn’t be sensibly described as reactions of someone nursing secessionist ambitions!!! On July 29, 1966, the much-awaited (multiple sources, including General Madiebo, later Biafran Army Chief had warned Ironsi) revenge-coup took place. The initial objective of the Northern officers who led the coup (Murtala Muhammed; Yakubu Gowon; Theophilus Danjuma et al) appeared clearly to be secession (“araba”-separation in Hausa) from Nigeria until they were reportedly persuaded by the British High Commissioner that “you’ve got it all now; why settle for half” and Gowon became Head of State leading to Ojukwu’s first disagreement with the Northern military establishment. Consistent with his (naïve) nationalism and pro-establishment inclinations, as well as his desire to maintain the integrity of the last remaining national organisation-the army, Ojukwu insisted on following military hierarchy which required Brigadier Ogundipe, Ironsi’s No 2 as Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters and Western officer to take over as Head of State. Unfortunately Ogundipe had been successfully intimidated from staking a claim to the office, and accepted posting as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom! Many Eastern/Igbo officers had been killed during the July counter-coup evidently as collateral revenge for the earlier deaths in January. In September 1966, a second pogrom commenced with large scale killings everywhere across Northern Nigeria. After Gowon’s broadcast on September 29, rather than abate, the killings intensified! Pain, anger and rage was felt across the East, especially by Ojukwu who to his eternal regret had urged those who fled in May to return, many to their brutal end! I find it hard to fault Ojukwu’s subsequent resolve to insist on ensuring security and protection for the Igbos. There was a manifest need for Nigeria, if it wanted Igbos in the country, to offer regrets, firm assurances and restitution, but none was forthcoming. Even if some military officers of Igbo origin were guilty of killing Northern military and political figures, that could not excuse genocide directed against thousands of civilians, especially after revenge had already been vented against Ironsi and several Igbo officers. The first threat of force was issued by Gowon on 30/11/66 and the first shells were fired on 6/7/67 by the “federal” side. The Aburi agreement, meant to resolve the crisis, freely signed by all parties under Ghanaian leader, General Ankrah’s auspices was unilaterally rejected by Gowon, upon his return to Lagos on 26/1/67. The accord established equal, federal control over the armed forces through the Supreme Military Council (SMC); a military HQ with equal regional representation; regional military area commands; major national appointments-diplomatic, senior armed forces and police, and “super-scale” federal civil service and corporations would be made by the SMC-in effect, Ojukwu’s quest was equality of federating regions and rejection of hegemony! Unceasing calls for “true federalism”, “zoning”, “rotation”, “federal character”, “non-marginalisation” etc. show that Ojukwu’s position was prescient. He had his faults-questions about military strategy and governance in Biafra; neglecting fears of non-Igbo minorities; naively joining the NPN upon his return from exile; an anti-June 12 (and pro-Abacha) posture during the Abiola and Ken Saro-Wiwa matters etc, but his place in Nigerian history (and Igbo folklore) is assured. In 2012, forty-six years after 1966, we still talk about politically-inspired violence, such as last year’s post-election killings! The report of the Justice Onyuike Tribunal in 1966 suggests that 45,397 were killed and over 1.6million fled East. Was Ojukwu expected to acquiesce in this? Was “Biafra” not entitled to legitimate self-defence in these circumstances? It is time the truth about 1966 is established. The underlying issue in the events of 1966/1967-1970 was the nature of our federalism and the need for equity and equality amongst Nigeria’s federating units. That issue would not go away! As Professor Attahiru Jega wrote in “Foundations of Nigerian Federalism: 1960-1995” edited by Elaigwu and Akindele, “in a pluralistic society such as Nigeria, with a federal set-up in which dominant nationalities are regionally located, with skewed access to power and societal resources, where national resources are concentrated at the centre and the military have dominated politics, centrifugal forces would, invariably, tend to predominate”. When federalism was accepted by Nigeria’s leaders at the Constitutional Conference in 1953, it was recognised as “the only feasible answer to the problems of national integration".

Nigeria in 2012 (2)

Nigeria’s economic fundamentals and outlook should ordinarily be considered excellent-large population, labour force and market; 7-8% GDP growth; strong oil markets; interest from foreign investors; a democracy that has lasted from 1999, the longest since independence; a consumerist society with strong inclination to purchase goods and services; entrepreneurial, resourceful people, reasonably educated and enlightened people who speak English. These advantages are however offset by corruption; and since the 2011 elections, by the post-election violence which forewarned of regional tensions; “Boko Haram” fundamentalist terrorism; the fuel subsidy crisis; some elements in the opposition who seem bent on the overthrow of the current government; and strong anti-reform lobby and vested interests opposed to privatisation and economic reforms. Given the “dangerous demographics” which I highlighted last week, and the shocking poverty data just released by NBS, the potential for social crisis is high! By NBS’ figures, absolute poverty (minimal requirements for minimal standards of food, clothing, healthcare and shelter) was 60.9% (99.28million people); relative poverty (by reference to living standards of the majority) was 69% (112.5million); and by the World Bank’s dollar per day measure, 61.2% (100.5million) were poor! Subjectively 93.9% of Nigerians considered themselves poor!!! NBS projects that relative, absolute and $/day poverty may have risen to 71.5%, 61.9% and 62.8% in 2011. Why doesn’t economic growth translate to lower poverty and greater employment in Nigeria? As I have argued several times, the answer lies in the structure of our GDP and governance! Around 75% of GDP (in Q3 2011, it was 76.2%) is made up by only three sectors-agriculture (43.64%), crude petroleum and natural gas (14.27%) and wholesale and retail trade (18.29%). Agriculture is sub-modern, largely subsistence, non-value adding, not sufficiently linked to agro-allied and manufacturing, and does not create jobs. The oil sector is dominated by crude export carried out by multinationals who simply pay governments share of revenue over to the treasury-for appropriation and spending by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats! The downstream refining, petrochemicals and allied sectors are undermined by a misguided petroleum subsidy and the industry value-chain remains undeveloped. Our traders import and sell foreign produced goods and most manufacturing raw materials are also imported. In effect, across sectors we add no value domestically, and whenever we consume, we create jobs offshore. Consequently GDP growth makes no impact on poverty and unemployment irrespective (by and large) of the growth rate. The large size of government (numerous federal MDAs, large recurrent spending, multiple and overlapping commissions and agencies; 36 states with inefficient bureaucracies and 774 local governments; and the relatively large expenditure devoted to maintaining the legislature at federal and state levels and a myriad of political appointees) means there is very little left for capital and social spending. Poverty and unemployment indices will not change iuntil we restructure both our economy and our politics! In terms of sectors, telecommunications remains the outstanding growth sector in Nigeria at over 35% in Q3 2011 (it remains a mystery that Nigerians refuse to apply the lessons of telecommunications to downstream petroleum and power), far ahead of wholesale and retail trade (11.84%), hotels and restaurants (11.81%), solid minerals (11.5%), and building and construction (10.72%). With the exception of the low value-adding (!) trading sector, all the other high-growth sectors are too small to matter! Manufacturing has shrunk to 3.51% of GDP, grows by 8.15% and utilises only 57-58% of its capacity! Upstream oil GDP growth has slowed in 2011 and was actually negative (-0.34%) in Q3 2011 due to the absence of clear industry structure and fiscal terms which the petroleum industry bill was supposed to provide. Until recently agricultural sector growth was a function of divine benevolence (rainfall) and not policy-hopefully the new minister is changing that. For now the sector grows at a low 5.82%. Finance and insurance has also contracted to a shocking 2.98% of GDP, with abysmal growth rate of 3.98%, due almost certainly to incessant policy changes, industry restructuring and effects of industry mistakes made between 2005 and 2009. The capital market remains well below its 2008 peak, and the likelihood is that recovery, both in financial and capital markets may yet be deferred at least to second half of 2012, or beyond! All indications are that 2012 will be an inflationary year, with multiple drivers-petrol prices, electricity tariffs, tariffs on some imported food commodities mid-year, wages, fiscal push, high interest rates and depending on oil sector developments, possibly higher exchange rates as well. While stressed European and developed country economies may lower global oil demand, geo-political issues in the middle-east (especially Iran versus Israel) may push prices in the opposite direction. However we expect Saudi-Arabia to attempt to bridge absence of Iranian oil in global supply and therefore mitigate a sustained rise in prices. We are likely to see gradual rise in electricity output from 2012 and greater investments in the sector. It is critical that government completes it power sector privatisation this year, having missed earlier deadlines. Consumer purchasing power will be lower, and business operating costs will be higher! Policy makers, managers and entrepreneurs have their work cut out in 2012-global risks; difficult reforms and fiscal stress; domestic inflation and challenging markets; concerns over security of assets and people; and rising operating expenses. We may take solace in the fact that peers all over the world may face similar challenges!

Nigeria in 2012 (1)

Nigeria will be confronted with various challenges in 2012. Externally we will face a risky global environment while at home we grapple with self-inflicted political wounds and difficult economic reforms and structural change. Macroeconomic fundamentals will remain strong, but all the post-election optimism about the country’s outlook may be dissipating somewhat in the face of insecurity, socio-political and religious tensions and deferred financial and capital market recovery. Risky Global Context! One word will characterize the global economy in 2012-“difficult”! The World Bank in its Global Economic Prospects 2012 says, ““The world economy has entered a very difficult phase characterised by significant downside risks and fragility”. The principal cause is resumed financial turmoil induced by European fiscal crisis which is spreading to developing and high income countries. The Bank also notes declining capital flows to developing economies and probability of European recession accompanied by slowing growth in developing countries. Based on the above, the bank lowered its growth prospects for 2012 to 2.5percent. UNCTAD similarly revises projected global growth downwards to 2.6percent, noting that “the world economy is on the brink of another major downturn” and expresses concerns about continued jobs crisis, European sovereign debt, banking and financial sector concerns, fiscal austerity, unemployment and poor business and consumer confidence. The IMF notes that “global recovery stalls, downside risks intensify” in its January 2012 World Economic Outlook Update and also revised projected growth down to 3.5per cent. Many European economies have suffered ratings downgrades and have negative outlooks, and all three reports highlight significant downside risks! In this sombre context, global demand may fall and oil prices (and other food and commodity prices) which appear to have peaked since April/May 2011 may be susceptible to decline. With our lower reserves cushion, high foreign currency demand and budget deficits, a shock in global oil and commodity markets will affect Nigeria, probably severely. Dangerous Demographics!! Domestically the biggest cause for concern, and probably the fundamental underpinning of our socio-political problems may be the looming demographic catastrophe Nigeria faces! According to NBS data, Nigeria has over 104 universities; 75 polytechnics, more than 30,000 junior and senior secondary schools; and almost 100,000 primary schools. Our universities had an average of 800,000 students over the last five years; over 1.37 million students were enrolled in universities, polytechnics and colleges of education in 2006, and over 1.98million in 2007, meaning that perhaps 2-3million graduates will enter the labour force by 2011/2012! Our 2011 population was 164million people, with a potential labour force of 67.2million people, of whom 16million (or 23.9%) were unemployed! Unemployment has risen from 13.4% in 2004 to 23.9% by 2011. Within the restive age group of 15-24 years, unemployment is 37.7%! Twenty percent of graduates of all tertiary institutions are unemployed! In 2011, 2.217million persons joined the ranks of the unemployed!!! In many states (Yobe, Zamfara, Sokoto, Imo, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Katsina, Rivers, Delta, Borno, Kano, Kaduna, Benue), unemployment is higher than the national average! Meanwhile this idle and disaffected population is angry, more engaged and better connected! There are 95.3million active telephone lines (as at November 2011) according to NCC data, and the telecommunications sector now has capacity to provide every Nigerian with a telephone line (with total installed capacity of 172.4million lines. Internet penetration is rising and more people are connected to social media. The potential for citizen action is significantly higher as well-demonstrated during the fuel subsidy protests. Policy Challenges! Elevated Political Risk!! Nigeria’s government barely scraped through a mini-insurrection over removal of fuel subsidies. The 6-day nationwide strike, by our firm RTC’s calculations cost the nation N215.77billion ($1.4bn). Our assumptions note that the upstream petroleum sector was not on strike leaving oil production and export unimpaired. We also included a (probably) generous discount of 25percent of agricultural output to account for front-end activities including possible transportation delays. Several other policy battlegrounds however remain-power privatisation; rise in electricity tariffs; resistance to economic reforms and privatisation; rationalisation of federal MDAs; petroleum industry bill; cashless Nigeria, and the deferred battle over downstream petroleum deregulation. We expect some intra-government tensions and a possible confrontation between the House of Representatives and the Executive. Vested interests-regional interests, crony capitalists, bureaucrats and their allies in parliament and others, along with labour will oppose economic reforms all the way! The best policy outcome in 2012 will be successful power sector privatisation. There are dangerous political scenarios in 2012 and beyond. The 2011 elections and anger over North-South power sharing; and “Boko Haram” terror and insecurity are straining national unity and cohesion. We expect Nigeria to step back from the brink, as usual, but worse outcomes are possible! There are elements in the political space who appear willing to over-extend political brinkmanship beyond margins of safety, and it is easy to project the activities of “Boko Haram” to a point in which citizens head back to their home regions.

The Evolution of "Boko Haram" (2)

It seems Bauchi State Governor Isa Yuguda was instrumental in persuading late President Yar’adua to curtail the menace of “Boko Haram”. Yuguda having decamped from PDP to ANPP, duly won the governorship in 2007. He subsequently became Yar’adua’s son-in-law, and returned to the PDP, possibly losing some political goodwill in the process. He may have dreaded returning to the electorate in 2011 with “Boko Haram” roaming free in Bauchi! I have previously noted that having fallen out with the sect, then Borno governor Modu Sherrif was also eager to see off Boko Haram. When security forces turned on “Boko Haram” between July 26 and 29, 2009, they responded in a surprising manner-in Maiduguri, they exacted “revenge” in a perverse manner by turning on the nearest Christians! While under attack from the army and police, Muhammed Yusuf ordered his followers to capture hundreds of Christians. The male captives had a simple choice-renounce your faith or die! For the females, it was renounce your faith or stay as captives, meaning slavery, servitude or worse! The worst treatment was reserved for Christian clergymen-three pastors were be-headed, with the executioners shouting “Allah Akbar” in wild celebration accompanied by celebratory gunfire. Pastor George Orjih of Goodnews Church, Wulari, Maiduguri was one of the three. Muhammed Yusuf personally urged him to renounce his faith and live, which the Pastor rejected and instead actually preached to Yusuf to accept the Christian salvation! Incensed, Yusuf ordered his immediate slaughter! Fortunately for most of the captives, government prevailed in that confrontation, so most of them were released after Yusuf’s capture. Once it launched its Jihad in 2010, Boko Haram has had four categories of targets-specific Islamic clerics who disagreed with its teachings or methods; government and security institutions and personnel; institutions which they considered abhorrent to Islam particularly hotels and beer parlours; and Christians and/or Churches. It is easy to understand why they would attack the first three groups-opposing Islamic clerics could potentially undermine their theology and legitimacy; government and security agencies had attacked them and killed their leaders; the disdain Moslems are supposed to have for alcohol and prostitution is well-known. The resort to targeting Churches and Christians, who till then had played no part whatsoever in this essentially intra-Muslim quarrel was inexplicable-the then president, governors of all states in which BH were attacked, the then National Security Adviser, etc, all being Muslims. The trend of BH attacking Churches and Christians has since accelerated, rather than decline culminating in the Christmas day 2010 attacks on Churches in Jos; 2011 bombing of the Madalla Church and killings in Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Borno, Bauchi, Niger and Plateau States. As previously stated, one can observe a clear transition from BH when it was pre-occupied with local politics in the North-East and Kano, and the newer version which seems to have a national or even international agenda (evidenced by the attack on the UN headquarters). It is clear that BH has been influenced by Nigerian politics in general, and the North-South power struggle that ensued after Yar’adua’s death in particular. Indeed it is possible to interpret their January 2 2012 ultimatum on Southerners to leave the North in explicit political terms-perhaps an attempt to reverse the April 2011 scenario in which a Christian Southerner obtained twenty-five per cent of the votes or more in most Northern states! One could also draw a parallel between the objectives of this ultimatum and the post-election violence which erupted across Northern Nigeria last April. Northern politicians such as Adamu Ciroma, Lawal Kaita, Yahaya Kwande, Muhammadu Buhari and Atiku Abubakar had made statements which may have contributed towards creating an environment conducive to or indifferent to political violence. Changes in Boko Haram’s methods and activities (such as suicide bombing) also suggest a link-up with Al Qaeda. The body language of some Northern leaders (such as Borno elders who spoke out only whenever government took military action and the initially tepid response of the Northern establishment) while not establishing complicity with BH, indicated at least mixed emotions! The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) very recently issued a shocking statement claiming falsely that BH’s ultimatum was in response to an earlier one issued by the “South-South”, in effect justifying same! The most blatant justification of BH has however been the one by CBN governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi who claimed to the Financial Times, that the BH phenomenon was a consequence of divergent federal resource flows to the South-South and North-East since the 13 per cent derivation principle in 1999! Sanusi ignored any facts that contradicted his logic-Cross-River and Edo States (both in South-South) which get next-to-nothing from derivation should then be consumed by terrorism; South-West and North-Central States who do not benefit from derivation haven’t shown the same tendency; the South-East zone actually receives lower federal allocations than North-East; and how does Sanusi explain pre-1999 religious riots in the North (when Northern States took the highest allocations based on population figures) including the 1980 Maitatsine crisis, or the 1995 beheading of Gideon Akaluka in Kano? I recommend that anyone interested in resolving the crisis of poverty, unemployment and ignorance in the North, should seek the solution in education, skills acquisition, focus on economic development and avoidance of extremist religious philosophy! The BH crisis has its roots in a dangerous combination of extremist religious ideology, abysmal social conditions and political brinkmanship!!!

The Evolution of "Boko Haram"

Muhammed Yusuf, founder of “Boko Haram” (BH) was a devout student and follower of Sheik Jafar Mohammed, a notable and influential Islamic scholar before he encountered a radical ideology (modelled on the Afghan Taliban) which counselled a total boycott of democracy, government and western education. Yusuf was attracted to this “pure” form of Islam, which led to a confrontation with his former mentor, who regarded such teachings as extremist, and who was later assassinated, probably by Yusuf’s followers in Kano in 2007. Shehu Sani claims that BH’s actual origin dates back to 1995 when it was called Sahaba and led by one Abubakar Lawan who later proceeded to the University of Medina for studies, paving way for Yusuf’s take-over. Some others trace the “Boko Haram” tendency to the Maitatsine group of the 1980s. The group is however formally believed to have started in Maiduguri in 2002. The group’s formal name is Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’wati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophets’ Teachings and Jihad) though observers nicknamed them “Boko Haram” (consistent with their teachings and conduct) which meant “western education is sacrilege/sin/forbidden”. They seek to abolish the secular Nigerian constitution in favour of an Islamic state, and want to establish a complete Sharia-based state in the 19 Northern states and all over Nigeria. Sometimes known as “Yusuffiya” after its founder, BH also abhorred banking, taxation and western jurisprudence/court systems, and regarded the mixing of boys and girls in schools as improper. Yusuf also rejected scientific explanation for natural phenomenon. It appears clear (and was recently admitted by the new leader, Imam Abubakar Shekau, a hardline assistant of Yusuf now reportedly based in Qoundere, Cameroun) that the groups’ membership includes Chadians, Nigeriens, Camerounians and other non-Nigerians and its organisational structure provided for “Amirs” in Chad and Niger! Yusuf’s landlord and in-law, late Baba Fugu allowed him build a mosque in the railway quarters area of Maiduguri, and along with Shekau, Yusuf developed his “state-within-a-state”-including a cabinet, ruling council (Shura Council), departments, brigade of guards, military wing (with the “armies” recruited from the large pool of “Almajiris”), Hisbah, a large farm, and court with Yusuf as judge! As Yusuf’s empire expanded, there is little doubt that security agencies and the Nigerian state were aware of these developments. But in its dysfunctional state, they either looked the other way, or when security warned, their counsel was ignored! Yusuf’s message resonated with the large number of pious, poor, uneducated, unemployed and disaffected youth and even some undergraduates and university lecturers joined his ranks. As his influence expanded, Boko Haram became attractive to politicians and soon was to form an “alliance” with the Borno State Government under Senator Ali Modu Sherriff who became governor in 2003. Sherrif appointed one of Yusuf’s associates, Alhaji Buji Foi as Commissioner for Religious Affairs and Water Resources, and took the group under his wings, further expanding their influence and power, and making Yusuf quite wealthy. There was a political and social context to all this. Modu Sherrif was an opposition ANPP governor who was ready to use any means possible to defend his power base from the marauding PDP. Sherrif and his fellow ANPP governors, as well as their presidential candidate, then Muhammadu Buhari had championed what Obasanjo called “political Sharia” to insulate themselves from the ruling PDP onslaught. BH expanded to Bauchi, Yobe, Kano, and other Northern states, and quite plausibly helped ANPP sustain their holds on Borno and Yobe, and to capture Bauchi and Kano from the PDP. Then Sherrif and Yusuf fell apart! Knowing the power of his Frankenstein creation, Sherrif (and Isa Yuguda who having secured power on ANPP platform in Bauchi had headed back to PDP) launched a “pre-emptive” (in Yuguda’s words) strike against BH between July 26 and 29, 2009 routing the group in Bauchi, Maiduguri, Yobe and Kano States….or so it then seemed! It was convenient to all concerned to kill Yusuf, Boi and Baba Fugu! Meanwhile the political environment was changing in favour of BH’s narrative! President Yar’adua who gave the order to crush BH died and Northern politicians, Imams, Emirs and elite appeared unhappy that his Vice-President, Jonathan, a Southern Christian would take-over from him. To make things worse, Jonathan proceeded to contest and win the 2011 elections against Northern threats and intimidation. BH duly underwent a transformation. To provide troops, jail breaks were organised-on September 8, 2010 from Bauchi Prisons; and Yola Prisons on April 22, 2011 where detained members were freed. A transition in terms of funding, logistics, training, operational capabilities, intelligence and audacity were also evident. How and who oversaw these transformations? At the latest, by January 2010 when BH launched its Jihad with its first terrorist attack in Maiduguri, it may have linked with Al Queda as recently confirmed by the Nigerien foreign minister. From ride-by shootings on “okadas” in Maiduguri and environs, they graduated to audacious attacks on police headquarters in Abuja; bombing the United Nations Headquarters also in Abuja; and the Christmas day bombing of the St. Theresa’s Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State! Suicide bombings also came into the mix! The suspicious circumstances of the “escape” of Kabiru “Sokoto” (of Biu), the alleged Madalla bomber in the custody of Zakari Biu confirms that BH may have links high up in the police, security agencies, traditional and religious establishment, and political and elite circles.