The Ironsi Syndrome (Repeat)

General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi the unintended beneficiary of Majors Ifeajuna and Nzeogwu’s abortive coup of January 15, 1966, took power largely unprepared for its political and administrative implications. Outside the barracks and battle-field, he was out of his elements! Adewale Ademoyega in his book, “Why We Struck” wrote that Nzeogwu and himself quickly christened Ironsi’s a “do-nothing government”, described him as “non-revolutionary and reactionary” and noted that Ironsi’s primary governing strategy was the “ill-conceived notion of placating the Northerners”. His job admittedly wasn’t easy given prevailing circumstances! Max Siollun in “Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture 1966-1976” noted “as the pattern of killings in the January coup emerged, Northern soldiers became increasingly enraged by the murder of their two most senior politicians…and their four most senior soldiers by Igbo officers”. Being Igbo, Ironsi betrayed guilt complex in relations with the North and resorted to appeasement. Siollun documented Ironsi’s dilemma-“if Aguiyi-Ironsi bowed to Northern pressure and immediately tried the Majors, he would face a backlash from Southern officers, many of whom held sensitive military posts. If he went with Southern opinion and released them, he might be faced with a mutiny by Northern soldiers…Aguiyi-Ironsi was caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place…it proved impossible to keep both sides simultaneously content.” Both Lt. Col David Ejoor and “Black Scorpion” Benjamin Adekunle also stated they didn’t envy Ironsi’s position! Ironically even though Ironsi’s Supreme Military Council (SMC) eventually scheduled public trial of the mutineers for October 1966, he would be dead and buried before then! Ironsi appointed relatively junior Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon as Army Chief of Staff “based on a desire to redress the imbalance caused as a result of the killings of officers of Northern origin” but “however his good intentions were mistaken in certain quarters and he was seen as a weakling who sought to over-appease the Northern elements in the army and by implication, the Northerners in general” (General Phillip Effiong, Ojukwu’s eventual deputy in “Nigeria and Biafra: My Story”) Brigadier Ogundipe had been under the impression that he was summoned back from abroad to head the army and was initially unsure what his responsibilities at the “Supreme Headquarters” were. Effiong says, “in retrospect, it could be argued that this (Gowon’s appointment) was Ironsi’s palpable mistake”. Ironsi also appointed Kam Salem as Police Inspector General and M. D Yusuf as Head of Police Special Branch (Intelligence) placing his entire security in Northern hands!!! Ironsi’s personal orderly and bodyguard and one of his ADCs were also Northerners! In spite of appeasement however, Northern anger rose, rather than ebb! Apart from a desire to see the mutinous officers punished, the North was incensed by two other Ironsi decisions-planned rotation of military governors and battalions, and the infamous Decree 34 which purported to unify the civil services of the regions and federation. Even though all members of the SMC took part in these erroneous decisions, Northern leaders took it as Ironsi’s Igbo conspiracy to enslave the North! According to General Alexander Madiebo, General Officer of the Biafran Army, (“The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War”) “the plot to overthrow General Ironsi’s government was slow, deliberate and systematic” and Siollun concurs that “plotting by the Northern officers was carried out almost openly” with Lt. Colonel Murtala Muhammed, then Inspector of Signals and Majors Martin Adamu and Theophilus Danjuma as leaders. Danjuma and Lieutenant Walbe were part of Ironsi’s security detail!!! Madiebo believes that the plot was hatched at Ahmadu Bello University and executed by academics, civil servants, politicians and military officers of Northern origin. Madiebo agrees that Ironsi “aspired to rule successfully by compromise. For this reason, he tried to placate those who sought to destroy him and took no action on various substantiated reports available to it concerning plans to overthrow it”. Many senior Northern officers openly called for a coup, particularly Murtala Muhammed and Hassan Katsina. Muhammed openly called Ironsi a “fool” and Katsina declared that when Northerners were ready for their own coup, it would be very “bloody indeed” and conducted in broad daylight! Northern participants at a platoon commanders’ course in Kaduna (including one Lieutenant Abacha!) sent an anonymous letter to Gowon warning senior Northern officers to act or else they would; restiveness of Northern rank and file prompted a security review led by Ogundipe but no pre-emptive action was taken. A meeting of Emirs and Chiefs in June 1966 demanded abrogation of Decree 34 and return to the pre-coup regional status quo; punishment for participants in the January coup; and no investigations must be conducted into the May 1966 riots in which up to 3,000 Southerners were killed. These demands demonstrated that Ironsi’s emboldened adversaries now recognised he could be pushed around without consequences!!! On June 19, 1966, based on very credible reports of an imminent coup, Madiebo rushed to Lagos to inform Ironsi, who responded by inviting Gowon, Kam Salem and MD Yusuf to listen to Madiebo’s account. The three gentlemen naturally denied the report and Madiebo was chastised for rumour-mongering! In Madiebo’s words, “Ironsi had lost his last opportunity to survive by asking the very people who were alleged to be plotting to overthrow him to investigate their plot and report to him”. By July 29, 1966, Ironsi was dead and Gowon succeeded him!!! *Columnist’s Note-This article was first published on July 25, 2012. It is repeated by inspiration.