Like a simple wound left without prompt and decisive attention, the situation in the Niger-Delta appears to be getting deeper and wider. In such circumstances, the longer the wound is left without careful management, the greater the risk that the wound will get infected and perhaps malignant. At times, the degenerate part may have to be surgically extracted and sometimes the patient may indeed die. What is usually required to prevent such a tragic consequence is immediate medical attention; careful cleaning of the wound; examination and diagnosis of the situation by a competent, dedicated and sincere people; and immediate remedial actions to ensure the wound is treated, and managed until it fully heals.
The deeper the wound and the longer it is allowed to fester, the more radical and painful the curative approach usually required, and the wound may heal only after a very sustained period of treatment and management. Where the patient is a child or some other person under the care and authority of a parent or other person, the parent may have to accept responsibility for ensuring the right conditions to ensure the wound is properly treated and heals-the right doctor and hospital, compliance by the patient with the doctor’s instructions, the right drugs, and an environment which facilitates the treatment and healing process. The child’s siblings and friends may also have to help. But whether the patient is a child or an adult, he or she will also bear some responsibility for wanting to be healed and must behave in a manner compatible with the desire for healing.
I suspect the above metaphor represents the paradigm with which we will have to address the Niger-Delta problem. Nigeria is the patient, the Niger-Delta is the wound, and the federal government is the parent. The wound has been left to degenerate since before independence. I have just finished reading the Willinks Commission Report of 1957, and what I find shocking is that there is nothing about the situation in the region that was not known as early as the 1950s-the fears of the Rivers, Delta and other minorities about their marginalisation in the emerging Nigerian federation, difficulty of the terrain in terms of development, the regions arguments questioning the inheriting of sovereignty over the region from the British colonialists by the Nigerian State (i.e. “resource control”), and questions about the structure of Nigerian federalism. Yet Nigeria essentially did nothing about the situation.
In addition however, after independence and large scale commercial exploitation of oil, we added new dimensions-environmental degradation, military rule, a worsening federal system, civilian political regimes that lacked popular legitimacy and between 1999 and 2003, a greedy regional elite and a particularly irresponsible set of political leaders in the region and much of the rest of the country. All of this in a context in which virtually all of the country’s revenues were extracted from the region; most of it was spent in other regions; and poverty and desperation in the region was growing in leaps and bounds. At the same time, corruption was growing phenomenally and ensuring that only a marginal fraction of the funds supposedly committed to the regions development was available for that purpose.
When Isaac Adaka Boro signalled the depth of discontent in the region, he was suppressed and ended up dying in the Nigerian civil war fighting on the Nigerian side. When Ken Saro Wiwa rose up on behalf of the Ogoni people to raise national and international attention to the perceived injustice in the region, we did not attempt a reasoned dialogue to understand the concerns of the people, and address them. When the agitation for resource control started, we did not examine the issues and at least try to negotiate a consensus acceptable to all. We did not intensify the development of the region in any significant manner. Unfortunately some of the political leaders in the region damaged the argument for resource control-the best way to justify a call for more resources, is to demonstrate what was done with available ones, and not to embezzle them. But then, a counter-argument is that corruption was a national phenomenon. The way governors in the north, east and west (and I dare say the federal government too!) perpetuated misery and poverty through mis-governance and theft of state resources was no different from that seen in the Niger-Delta. Except that the Niger-Delta governors had more resources to steal given the thirteen percent derivation funds available to them and the exceptional prices of oil.
Fortunately I think a better crop of governors appear to be emerging in some scattered locations all over the country including the Niger-Delta. I have observed for instance the Chibuike Amaechi regime in Rivers State committing huge resources to urban and rural road construction, primary health centres and general hospitals and education (including a massive infrastructural upgrade in the Rivers State University of Science and Technology) and I have mentioned these only because I have been able to personally verify some of these projects. Unfortunately criminality and brigandage has entered into the picture before such remedial actions were started. And in any event the degradation had gone on for over forty years so “treatment” will have to be continuous and sustained before the impact will be felt. And many of the actions required will also have to come from the Federal Government and other stakeholders.
Most importantly beneath the criminality and gangsterism, legitimate grievances remain unaddressed. The substantive questions about the structure of our federation, revenue allocation, responsibilities of states and federal government, state and community policing, taxation and the division of tax responsibilities amongst different tiers of government, the environment and the activities of oil and gas exploration companies, the effects of corruption on national development and constitutional and electoral reform have not yet been discussed with sincerity, let alone addressed. We believe that these fundamental issues will have to be resolved to the satisfaction of the constituent states and regions in the Nigerian federation before we can really make progress as a nation.
In addition and specifically concerning the Niger-Delta, a three-track strategy is required-a sincere and constructive discussion and engagement between all stakeholders (federal, state and local governments, community and civic associations, oil companies, NDDC, youth groups, media, donor agencies, etc) to achieve consensus on the region’s development. Secondly, massive and immediate infrastructural investment in the region-roads and bridges, railways, hospitals, urban renewal and new cities development, primary and secondary education, micro-finance institutions, as well as skills acquisition and youth and vocational centres. These actions will not only create jobs and signal a new commitment to the region’s economic development, they will deny legitimacy to the militants and criminals. It is only in this context that the third track-military and intelligence capacity building and strict and decisive law enforcement and security action can be effective.
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