Power, Propaganda and Reconciliation

I was inclined, for personal reasons, not to comment on the “crises” in Rivers State. I however concluded recently that because nothing I have read so far encompasses my take on the matter, there is an over-riding public interest in placing my perspective on record. I may have touched tangentially on the issue in two recent articles-“The NGF Crisis” and “Egypt or Nigeria”-but I have until now refrained from presenting a comprehensive narrative. In “The NGF Crisis”, I noted that Governor Amaechi won the governors’ election by 19 votes to 16. However it was predictable that the elections would be very close and the Forum would be factionalised in its aftermath. I placed the affair as a proxy battle between Northern and opposition power groups opposed to Jonathan and the presidency, and argued that both Amaechi (who was fighting against local sentiments), and Jonathan, apart from NGF’s policy and technical work which was bound to suffer, were strategic losers in the affair. My conclusion was that the best interest of both sides was probably best served by reconciliation. In “Egypt or Nigeria”, I cautioned against attempts to project a coup or revolution in Nigeria based on developments in Rivers State. The elements at play in the Rivers palaver are in my view quite base-incumbency versus ambition; a power struggle by displaced regional powers to reclaim hegemony from a yet un-stabilised new power, deploying an ally in the new power’s home base to exact maximum damage; the fury of an offended and insulted federal power unleashed on a provincial power who is desperate for survival; and a battle in which the contenders deploy asymmetric weapons-national power versus media propaganda! I did not think there were any fundamental principles in dispute or any overarching values in contention. Instead it was a contest driven essentially by power and politics! I think the roots of the issue stretch far longer than most analysts have suggested! When late President Yar’adua was in power, he had a group of friendly governors led by former Kwara Governor, now Senator Buki Saraki, that included Yar’adua in-law Isa Yuguda of Bauchi, Amaechi and now displaced ex-Governor Timipre Silva of the then Vice-President Jonathan’s Bayelsa State. We remember that during the Yar’adua power vacuum, when the sick President lay ill in Saudi Arabia, these Governors under the Saraki-led NGF were perceived to be disinclined to a Jonathan take-over, and then PDP Party Chairman, Ogbulafor who was allied to the group, lost his position once Jonathan took power. This crisis of confidence also denied Silva a second term in Bayelsa State. It may also be that Amaechi preferred his re-election to happen along with the rest of the 2011 general elections rather than after Jonathan had won the presidency and consolidated power by encouraging a lawsuit which cut short his tenure. While a temporary truce was reached in 2011 because most of the Governors did not wish to endanger their second term prospects, once the 2011 elections were over, a subtle battle resumed, this time with 2015 as the object. Amaechi had now inherited the NGF leadership while some former allies, including Gabriel Suswan of Benue, Ibrahim Shema of Katsina and Yuguda had defected to Jonathan’s camp! I believe the truce was broken through a series of developments-Amaechi’s support for Silva during the Bayelsa PDP primaries; the presidency’s perception that Amaechi was using the NGF against it; the conflicts between Amaechi and Dame Patience Jonathan over Okrika waterfront and sundry matters; and elements of Rivers State domestic politics along the Ikwerre-Ijaw/Kalabari fault lines. There probably was an escalation with deployment of federal power over appointments, contracts, infrastructure, oil wells and security against Amaechi and ipso facto Rivers State and Amaechi’s opposition to the State of Emergency declaration in the North-East was probably the final straw! All these were brought to a head with the NGF elections and the humiliation of the presidency whose party candidate was defeated by Amaechi’s North-West coalition. At this stage, no one has yet committed any constitutional infraction as up to this point, matters were yet in the realm of politics and deployment of power and administrative discretion. Even the embarrassment over the disputed NGF elections could still be tolerated since the NGF was not a constitutional creation but a voluntary association of Governors. The fracas on the floor of the Rivers State House of Assembly was however a different matter! It was a constitutional sacrilege for five legislators to attempt to impeach a speaker against the will of twenty-seven others. The fight in the legislature was a shame and the widely published thuggery by Chidi Lloyd was a disgrace and a crime. A massive propaganda war was then unleashed probably at significant cost to the treasury of the state and focus on its governance. Having said all, I return to my initial conclusion-that the optimal strategy for both Jonathan and Amaechi would appear in my opinion to be dialogue and reconciliation. That does not mean they must agree on political direction-Amaechi could choose to leave the PDP or could otherwise declare an intent to challenge Jonathan for the party ticket either as candidate or running-mate, but both parties have to put the state, nation and constitution above their ambitions. Amaechi would also have to somehow persuade Rivers State and the South-South region to his chosen path.