Ojukwu and Nigerian Federalism (2)

The January 1966 coup was led by five majors-Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Wole Ademoyega, Chris Anuforo and Don Okafor, though there were three other majors (Humphrey Chukwuka, Tim Onwuategwu, John Obienu); five captains (Ben Gbulie, Nwobosi, Oji, Ude and Adeleke); four lieutenants (Ezedigbo, Okaka, Oguchi and Oyewole) and seven 2-Lietenants involved. Overall leadership and conceptualisation may be attributed to Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna. Nzeogwu was a first-class, Sandhurst-trained soldier, a radical, courageous, anti-colonial and revolutionary officer who had become disillusioned with the direction of the emerging Nigerian nation, and a nationalist and patriot, who appeared incapable of tribalism and other parochial thinking. Ifeajuna had revolutionary ideas, but was a less-predictable person. I accept Obasanjo’s depiction of him in “Nzeogwu” as a “courageous coward” who had been involved in rebellion in secondary school and university, but always managed to escape punishment. In my judgment, Ifeajuna was as much a soldier as a politician! Nzeogwu may have made an error of judgment (though Ifeajuna’s strategic position as Brigade Major in Lagos was a valuable asset to the plotters) in choosing Ifeajuna as his main collaborator. This would eventually lead to the failure of the Majors’ coup attempt. Many of the predominantly Igbo officers involved in the coup were clearly angry over seeming designs for Northern hegemony over Nigeria and particularly the introduction of tribalism, nepotism, favouritism, cronyism and general lowering of standards (to the benefit of Northern officers and men) in the army. I would say however that there were two naïve idealists-Nzeogwu and Ademoyega (who Gbulie described as a “Yoruba intellectual” who studied history in university and drove a fast sports car in his book “Nigeria’s Five Majors”) amongst the five majors. Gbulie in particular revealed the mindset of the Igbo core-disgruntlement directed mainly at the North’s blatant attempts to take over the nation and army; but also at senior Yoruba officers like Brigadier S. L Ademulegun and Colonel R.A Shodeinde who they regarded as “tribalists”. It is not improbable that ethnic and tribal sentiments, as well as Nzeogwu’s single-mindedness and dedication accounted for success of the plotters in eliminating their Hausa/Fulani targets in Kaduna and Lagos while Ifeajuna and cohorts failed to eliminate Igbo targets such as Army GOC General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Eastern Premier Dr Okpara and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. At the end of the coup, the prime minister, Tafawa Balewa, Northern Premier Ahmadu Bello; and Northern officers-Brigadier Maimalari, Colonel Kur Mohammed, Lt.Colonels Abogo Largema, and Yakubu Pam had been killed. The largely politically illegitimate Western Premier S.L.A Akintola, Ademulegun and Shodeinde were also killed. All Igbo political and military targets had somehow escaped except for Lt.Colonel Arthur Unegbe. It wasn’t long before the coup was transformed in the minds particularly of Northerners into an Igbo attempt to wipe away their political and military leaders and the counter-coup of July 1966 which brought Yakubu Gowon (and the North) back to power became inevitable. Where was Ojukwu in all of these? Lt. Col Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu then, Brigade Commander in Kano was never consulted by the plotters probably because they saw him as a pro-establishment officer who was unlikely to sympathise with their plans, and because he was senior to all the coup plotters. There is no dispute over the fact that as the actual coup unfolded, Ojukwu absolutely refused to cooperate with Nzeogwu in Kaduna and the other plotters. Rather he rallied and kept his troops loyal to the federal government. He also protected Northern citizens including his friend, Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero during the period of uncertainty after the coup attempt. Indeed Ojukwu’s appointment as military governor of the Eastern Region was a clear acknowledgment of his loyalty to the nation and army authorities. It is indeed an irony that it was this same pro-establishment, nationalist and loyalist officer who would soon lead the Biafran rebellion against Nigeria! It is clear that circumstances thrust this role upon Ojukwu and he merely accepted the role history had earmarked for him. In summary the January 1966 coup was not explicitly an Igbo coup, but it was clearly Igbo-dominated. While certain of the plotters clearly did not have an ethnic agenda (Nzeogwu and the Yoruba participants-Ademoyega, Adeleke, Oyewole and 2nd Lieutenant Olafimihan), ethnic sensibilities may have lurked consciously or sub-consciously in the minds of many of the participants and those sentiments may have ultimately subverted the coup and cast it in a negative or dubious light. The counter-coup of July 1966 was predictable in this context, although it must also be pointed out that anger at Northern hegemonic designs appeared supported by evidence of NPC actions to sustain an illegitimate government in the West; take over the army officer corps; suppress the Tiv riots; and to dominate the rest of the country. While it is debatable whether or not the January 1966 coup was Igbo, there was no doubt about the July version-it was Northern revenge for the killing of their politicians and soldiers. But the Northern response would not stop at killing soldiers and politicians! Worse was soon to follow!!! *The historical accounts presented are based on my personal reading of virtually all existing literature on the 1966 coups, the civil war, Nigerian history and political economy and military history. All judgments and interpretations are mine.