Assessing Nigerian Political Risk

Political risk is usually elevated in Nigeria whenever we enter electoral cycles reflecting the fact that we are yet to become a stable, mature democracy. This season is no different. As we enter into 2010, politics, elections and succession will take the front burner and policy and governance will recede to the background. There are some economic implications usually associated with electoral cycles in Nigeria-fiscal expansion and a rash of contract awards as war chests are built, less value-for-money from government procurement etc. The macroeconomic implications may include higher inflation, foreign currency volatility and higher budget deficits. We have already seen some of these phenomena and the others may yet manifest.
The uncertainty introduced as regards the quality and legitimacy of the approaching party primaries and general elections, possible electoral violence, election-related disputes and litigation, policy continuity or instability etc, all help to undermine the investment climate and business and consumer confidence. In one of the most extreme examples, the 1993 elections indisputably won by Chief MKO Abiola was annulled plunging the country into the June 12 political crisis and the terrorist dictatorship of General Sanni Abacha. The 1983 elections were so massively rigged by the then National Party of Nigeria (NPN) that the ensuing government lasted only three months before it was toppled by the Generals. The earlier 1964-65 election cycle led directly to the 1966 military coup and the 1967-70 civil war. In Nigeria, politics and succession is a big deal and the appearance of political continuity and stability since the return to civil rule in 1999 should give no one an illusion that those dangerous electoral cycles are behind us.
Indeed the reality is that both the elections of 2003 and 2007 were of doubtful credibility and legitimacy and the polity may be unable to withstand a third straight flawed polls. As we move into 2010, the battlefield logistics therefore revolve around electoral reform (or lack of it); creation of an opposition alliance (in particular, will the opposition be able to successfully build a cohesive platform and agree on a common candidate for the presidency?); building of war chests (witness the spate of contract awards since the second half of 2009 and the budget proposals for 2010) and the role of the international community. Unfortunately the issue of presidential health introduces additional risks and uncertainties and further complicates the sensitive electoral cycle. If not carefully managed, some of the possible scenarios may be analogous to the June 12, 1993 crisis in their implications!
My working assumption is that given the concerns over President Umaru Yar’adua’s health, he will not be the PDP candidate in 2011. Of course his inner circle have an interest in projecting otherwise-to prevent him becoming a lame duck and to preserve their influence over succession-but it is unlikely that Yar’adua will endure the stress of another electioneering cycle. So who could be the candidates? I have a shortlist that includes the First Lady Turai Yar’adua; Governors Isa Yuguda and Saidu Dakingari; Chief Economic Adviser Tanimu Yakubu and Agriculture Minister, Sayyadi Abba Ruma; National Planning Minister, Dr Shamsudeen Usman; and Governors Bukola Saraki, Danjuma Goje, Namadi Sambo, Ibrahim Shema and Aliyu Babangida. In fact, technically all Hausa-Fulani Governors between 1999 to date may also be considered as possibilities.
Vice President Goodluck (!) Jonathan could also be the candidate, especially if he inherits the office before then. Of course, it cannot be presumed that if anything happens to Yar’adua, Jonathan will be “allowed” to succeed him as prescribed by the Constitution. His seemingly deliberate exclusion from international fora such as the United Nations and strenuous efforts to ensure that power is never formally handed over to him whenever the President is absent are indicators that some critical constituencies are averse to his possible succession. I can only hope that those tempted to consider preventing a constitutional succession recognise the clear implications-the notion of a Nigerian nation may be irredeemably damaged and any arguments for restraining the “militants” in the Niger-Delta and ethnic agitators from other parts of the country from seeking “self-determination” may lack credibility in such a scenario. Whatever happens, it is critical to Nigeria’s territorial integrity and national cohesion to preserve the integrity of the Constitution while negotiating future political arrangements.
Which factors or constituencies will exercise decisive influence over the choice of candidates? In the opposition, it is clear that Asiwaju Bola Tinubu, Atiku Abubakar, Muhammadu Buhari, Attahiru Bafarawa are the king pins. Nuhu Ribadu and Nasir El-Rufai have in effect become opposition-in-exile and may also be in play. In the PDP, there are evidently two critical power groups-the President and Katsina clique around him including the First Lady, Tanimu Yakubu, Dahiru Mangal, Abba Ruma, Ibrahim Shema etc, and the Governors. Already the Governors represent the political centre-of-gravity in the current political dispensation and if anything happens to Yar’adua, the Katsina clique immediately loses relevance and the Governors become the sole deciding group. I am watching this space!