Leveraging the "Amnesty"

To the best of my knowledge, the word “amnesty” does not occur in Nigerian law. The Webster’s dictionary defines amnesty as “an act of pardon on the part of a government or authority, absolving offenders or groups of offenders”. Section 175 of the 1999 Constitution however gives the President (and Section 212 gives state governors a similar power) to pardon any person “concerned with or convicted of any offence” after consultation with the Council of State. State Governors are required to similarly consult with the state’s Advisory Council on Prerogative of Mercy. These provisions would seem to provide legal cover for the President’s amnesty programme for Niger-Delta “militants”. More importantly, contrary to the argument advanced by several people, including some legal practitioners, the inclusion of persons “concerned with” an offence and not just those “convicted of” same in the constitutional provision, would appear to negate the argument that only convicted persons may be granted amnesty. So the problem with the amnesty programme in my view is essentially not a legal defect.
Secondly in spite of all my reservations about the scheme, I must admit that it appears to have been an apparent success, at least in the short term. The fact that all the key “militants”-Henry Okah, Soboma George, Government Tompolo, Ateke Tom, Farah Dagogo, and even those with interesting nicknames- Boyloaf, Osama Bin Ladin, Busta Rhymes etc have signed on to the programme should be cheering news for proponents of the scheme and sceptics like us have been somewhat confounded. In the short term, it is undeniable that there has been a reduction or even a temporary cessation of violence, sabotage, destruction of oil installations and other “militant activities” in the region.
However the real problem with the amnesty programme is that it does not address the fundamental issues that led first to genuine agitation and then its “deregulation” to less-scrupulous persons and inevitable criminalisation by persons from the Niger-Delta. I have on several occasions in this column discussed these fundamentals. Some of these are the need to discuss and redress the defects in our federal structure, defects which manifest in different forms in separate parts of Nigeria. In the North, its takes a Sharia colouration with Hausa-Fulani Muslims wondering why they cannot be ruled by a system of laws based on their Islamic beliefs. In the Yoruba West, the discussion is about fiscal federalism, devolution of powers and allowing each state or region develop at its own pace. In the East, it is a similar need for a more devolved federation and regional identity. Where as in the Niger-Delta, the issues are not addressed they degenerate into Boko Haram, OPC and MASSOB!
In this regard, the Niger-Delta is hardly unique, except that the anger over transfer of oil wealth and development to other parts of the country, while they bear the residual costs of oil exploration is more intense. That leads us to the other fundamentals-the absence of development, the destruction of their environment, the call for “resource control”, unemployment and poverty, electoral reform and corruption. The region is justifiably angry that its remains undeveloped while its resources have been invested in Lagos, Abuja and other parts of Nigeria; Corruption means that even the limited available resources are diverted into private pockets rather than invested in the region; absence of credible elections means that elected office holders are not accountable to the people and cannot be removed by them; poverty and unemployment means that there are large numbers of angry and hungry young persons desperate enough to join in militant activity, and their communities are sufficiently impoverished such that their actions find quiet or even active support within the society. The destruction of the Niger-Delta environment further re-enforces poverty and unemployment as it severely limits economic opportunities in the two most readily available occupations in the region-farming and fishing.
The point really is while this amnesty programme has been an apparent success, such will be temporary and fleeting except we proceed to deal with these fundamentals. Now it should have been the other way round-deal with the fundamentals and then offer amnesty but in our peculiarly Nigerian government magic, we have done the amnesty first before wondering about how to proceed from there. It is obvious that little attention has been paid to what many have called a “post-amnesty plan” even (as was recently demonstrated with the ejection of militants camped in a federal government college in Benin) concerning simple logistics. Didn’t anyone know that school would eventually resume? Beyond the Benin example, it is clear everywhere that no one has a clear view of what follows. As my initial title for this article asked, “amnesty… and then what?”
The process is already defective, but can it still be salvaged? Will someone now begin to deal with these fundamental issues? Will a legitimate dialogue with not just Niger-Delta leaders, but also the entire country commence to discuss our federal structure? Will Gen Abbe, Timi Alaibe and others in charge of the process now articulate a clear way forward? Otherwise the next scenes are predictable-the “militants” drift one-by-one back into criminality and militancy? New war Lords take over from the retiring (and wealthy) chiefs and as the Bible says, the last condition may indeed be worse than the former!