The Fuel Subsidy Palaver (2)

There is a socio-political, economic and global context to the fuel subsidy removal crisis. When President Jonathan overwhelmingly won the April 2011 general elections, his major opponents vehemently rejected the outcome. Their contrived angst couldn’t really be the actual polls conduct, but a carry-over of the sense of entitlement and anger felt by Northern politicians, traditional rulers and elites after the region’s perceived loss of power due to late President Umaru Yar’adua’s death. The promise to make Nigeria “ungovernable” was soon to manifest in escalation of religious tensions and “Boko Haram” terrorism leading to heightened insecurity across the country, especially the North East and North Central. Government’s confused and confounding response to the bombings, shootings and killings carried out in the name of “Boko Haram” angered most Nigerians. Meanwhile a more insidious de-legitimisation of Jonathan commenced in the media and hearts of citizens, especially in “core” North and South-West. The media onslaught was on two fronts-social media and mainstream press. Most “civil society activists” and vocal youth, the type that inhabits and dominates internet and social media tended to support either Nuhu Ribadu or Muhammadu Buhari, candidates of Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) respectively in last year’s elections. Typically idealistic and highly passionate (though sometimes lacking commensurate insight), they favoured change from the PDP status quo. While the South-East, South-South and North-Central had made up their minds long before the voting to back Jonathan, the battle was really over South-West votes. When ordinary South-Westerners turned to Jonathan, the activists became an often-angry minority determined to prove the majority had made a grievous error! They were joined by a large number of Northern facebook activists whose pro-Buhari posture was unequivocal, though nicely expressed in nationalistic terms. The mainstream media, particularly three strategic ones (a trusted medium that projects Northern intelligent opinion; a relatively new but powerful national newspaper reflecting dominant thinking in the South-West; a very influential daily which acquired very strategic anti-Jonathan columnists!) also turned against Jonathan. Jonathan’s public image steadily became “clueless”, weak, indecisive and floundering and his wife portrayed as a laughing stock! Meanwhile Jonathan’s communication machinery went to sleep, with key Jonathan supporters pre-occupied with the spoils of office!!! Jonathan who had brought Facebook into Nigerian politics and governance, became its most savage victim, and fared little better in mainstream press, where editors surprisingly found access to Jonathan’s media managers difficult. In governance, signs were mixed as Jonathan assembled a fair cabinet and an initial policy vacuum around the inchoate “transformation agenda” began to be filled. But government appointed prominent businessmen into an otherwise sound economic management team, an error that signalled prospects of crony capitalism. Disturbing rumours began to emerge about import duty waivers, and in the petroleum sector about management of the subsidy regime, which almost certainly contributed to ballooning subsidy figures. It was soon apparent that oil marketers were quite enamoured of petroleum minister, Dieziani Allison-Maduekwe as they flooded newspapers with congratulatory adverts every time she collected a honourary doctorate, national award or celebrated a birthday! The regime crowned these with a badly-managed jumbo national honours ceremony in which up to 350 persons-the bad, ugly, good and not-so-good received high honours. Meanwhile corruption, poverty and unemployment remained high; and middle-class Nigerians and youths having seen people power demonstrated in the so-called Arab Spring and “Occupy” protests were anxious to stage a Nigerian version, irrespective of history and context! In six short months, Jonathan well-meaning, simple but naïve, and lacking a vibrant political, strategy and communications backbone had lost so much goodwill that his sensible policy of downstream petroleum sector deregulation erroneously sold as subsidy removal, was going to be badly-received by the populace! There were also reasons to believe that Jonathan’s government and security services contained not a few persons whose loyalty to the regime was probably questionable! Ironically deregulation of downstream petroleum is the first real bold and transformational action taken by the Jonathan administration! The initiation of a Nigerian Sovereign Wealth Fund was positive and the 2012 budget proposals made the right calls on the big issues-deficit reduction, structural reform, fiscal consolidation, changing the ratio of recurrent to capital expenditure, social sector investments in education, health and employment generation, and agricultural policy and incentives, but all these positives were lost in social media bluster and anger. Deregulation of downstream petroleum is one of the most important and critical actions government can take in helping fulfil our economic potentials. We have finest grade crude oil, but we import refined petroleum products because we prefer the short term and short-sighted benefits of a wasteful and corrupt subsidy scam. Deregulation would promote huge private sector investments in refineries, petrochemicals and the value chain. It would create jobs and resolve permanently and sustainably petroleum product supply issues and is the structural solution (like import licensing and foreign exchange trading earlier) to the huge arbitrage opportunities that provide incentive for corruption. It is unlikely that the inflationary impact of N141 petrol would be fully reversed even if today the price was returned to N65. It is wiser to reach agreements on palliatives, anti-corruption, reduction in government waste and profligacy, and monitoring of the SURE (Subsidy Re-Investment and Empowerment) Programme and let Nigerians reap the benefits of a deregulated downstream petroleum sector.

The Fuel Subsidy Palaver

Government case for subsidy removal is unwisely based more on the need to increase government revenue, rather than deregulation to ensure investment, massive job creation and sustainable product supply in the downstream petroleum sector. Why should Nigerians want corrupt, inefficient and often dysfunctional governments to have enhanced revenue (and this is not about Jonathan, but ALL Nigerian governments to date!)? Of what significant benefit has government revenue been to our people? Nigerians don’t trust government, for good reasons, and Jonathan hasn’t yet given Nigerians overwhelming reasons to believe his is different. Nigerians are right to demand that the executive and legislature demonstrate willingness to make sacrifices, as requested of Nigerians. Personally I think Jonathan means well, and I trust Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (irrespective of the irrational social media ranting), but the essential character of the Nigerian state remains the same! However I have always supported downstream petroleum sector deregulation! Deregulation and liberalisation have transformed several sectors in Nigeria-financial services; airlines and aviation; broadcasting and media-radio, television and newspapers; upstream petroleum; universities and polytechnics; and telecommunications. Every sector which relatively “works” is conducted by the private sector; those that don’t-power, refineries, railways, water, public education, public health, security, judiciary, roads etc are managed by government! But not every sector can be deregulated and liberalised e.g. security, public health and education. Even there private players can play critical roles such as in the Lagos State Security Trust Fund by its private sector partners, which has transformed the security sector in Lagos. Clearly downstream petroleum sector should be deregulated so that private capital and investment can build refineries, petrochemical plants and invest down the sector’s value chain. The best insight is drawn from telecommunications experience. Imagine this was 2000 and we were pondering how to provide 100 million telephone lines for Nigerians. Would we hand over $20 billion to then corrupt and inefficient telecommunications monopoly, NITEL and given it “marching orders” to ensure it provides 100 million lines within ten years? That would have been sheer foolhardiness!!! We would simply have made individuals rich-Minister for Communication, senior civil servants, NITEL officials, contractors, and their friends and cronies, as we had done since independence! Ten years later, NITEL may have moved from 470,000 lines (actually less were working) to may be 750,000!!! Instead we acted sensibly-deregulated the industry, sold licenses to private investors (earning billions of dollars from digital mobile license auctions, 3rd generation licenses, second national carrier licenses; additional operator licences) and earned additional revenue from taxes, import duties, spectrum sales. We created thousands of jobs, with employees paying P.A.Y.E taxes to government and the sector impacted other industries-media and entertainment; advertising and public relations; professional practices; small and medium enterprises (even micro enterprises); and telecommunications enhanced overall economic productivity. Private capital in excess of $20 billion flowed into the economy, and government corruption in the telecommunications sector has disappeared! Today the Nigerian telecommunications sector has 125million connected lines, capacity for 167.8million lines and tele-density of 67.09 percent!!! Why would we so resolutely insist on not using a similar strategy for downstream petroleum??? If we hate corruption, one of our most important actions would be ending the petroleum subsidy scam which is now the largest single source of corruption in the Nigerian economy. The evident irony is that if subsidy stays, the happiest people will be the oil importers!!! I also think many of the opposing arguments are escapist-a gradual removal (that is what we have been doing since 1986! Global oil prices and exchange rates will go up, while petrol prices remain fixed, so a bigger subsidy will re-emerge and we will have merely postponed the evil day); the timing is wrong (evidence suggests that there could never be a right time to ask Nigerians to pay more for petrol. A sense of entitlement to cheap petrol has developed and prior governments have got negative reactions irrespective of timing); there was insufficient consultation (we hear stories of labour leaders who privately agree with government, but refuse to admit so publicly to preserve their populist base-they may later “change their minds” when they get into government!); it is IMF/World Bank policy (no intelligent observer needs an international conspiracy to know that spending one-third of your budget on a corrupt subsidy scam which stunts a potentially huge industry, while you lack jobs, infrastructure and social spending on education, health and transportation, is nothing short of insanity!) The big challenge is how government will calm the populace and alleviate the short-term impact on the poor and struggling masses. Government must urgently implement credible and well-thought out measures to ameliorate the impact on the vulnerable. I support downstream deregulation and I hope the policy is successful, but government must offer deep and meaningful sacrifices of its own. Government must also unequivocally begin the process of transforming itself before it can transform Nigeria! Jonathan must fight corruption, inefficiency and lack of commitment of government officials to the people. The people must henceforth see that government exists for public good and not private benefit!

The Jonathan Year

In Nigeria, 2011 was often about President Goodluck Jonathan-his nomination as PDP presidential candidate; his conduct of the 2011 elections; his victory and swearing-in as elected President; his acts of commission and omission since his election; his power sector road map, economic reforms and “transformation agenda”; the weak response to “Boko Haram” terrorism; the nature of his cabinet and other appointments; his surprising decision to start his presidency with advocacy for an extended single-term presidency; the impassioned debate sparked off by his downstream deregulation policy (popularly referred to as “subsidy removal”); the mannerisms and grammatical activities of his wife, First Lady Dame Patience Jonathan; his 2012 budget proposals; his “cluelessness” (the word most regularly used on internet and social media to describe Jonathan in 2011 was “clueless”) and naïveté in handling power; etc. There were other actors who stamped or attempted to stamp their authority on 2011. Asiwaju Bola Tinubu led the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) to an overwhelming victory over the rival Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in the South West, recovering gubernatorial seats in Ogun and Oyo States; retaining the prized Lagos governorship through a thumping victory; and sweeping state and federal legislative seats in all states in the region (except Ondo) including Ekiti and Osun, where the party had earlier re-taken governorships through judicial verdicts. The ACN also built credible coalitions across the country and mounted strong challenges in Benue, Akwa-Ibom, Kwara, Jigawa and Anambra States. Tinubu essentially reversed AD/AC/ACN losses to the PDP in 2003. Professor Attahiru Jega, who Jonathan appointed as Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Chairman to popular acclaim also contributed to shaping the year. The 2011 elections were by-and-large the first credible general elections after our 1999 return to civil rule, and though the elections kicked off on a shaky rule, all was well that ended well! Most dispassionate observers, local and international agreed that though not perfect, the elections generally reflected the will of the Nigerian people. Two of President Jonathan’s appointees made a quick impact-agriculture minister, Dr Akinwunmi Adesina and returning Minister of Finance AND Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. Adesina hit the ground running, revitalising agricultural policy for the first time in decades. Until his coming, the sector was about fertiliser corruption, phony silos and other strategems for corruption and deliberate misallocation of resources. Now Nigeria is addressing the issues central to agricultural development-financing, value chains, properly targeted subsidies (zero duty on imported agricultural machinery; interest subsidies on agricultural loans etc). Okonjo-Iweala proved her mettle as finance minister between 2003 and 2006. This time she has returned transparency to federal, state and LG fiscal allocations; set up a system to improve turnaround time at the ports; championed the downstream deregulation policy; and started the process of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. At the state level, Governors Fashola and Amaechi of Lagos and Rivers States remain torch-bearers for that tier of government. Fashola’s achievements in security, infrastructure and social sector investments (health, education, women and youth empowerment and poverty alleviation) and his calm and humane leadership are a testimony to the possibilities if Africa can find the right leadership. Amaechi’s investments in education, health, agriculture, power and roads will transform Rivers State when they are completed and made fully operational. Dame Jonathan enjoyed space in social media and national folklore often due to her alleged grammatical interventions. It is difficult to say if she actually made the statements attributed to her, as an industry appears to have developed around creating statements purportedly made by the first lady. However Dame Jonathan played an important role in mobilising women across the country to vote for her husband and while her opponents and their agents focussed on her grammar, she proved that ordinary voters and not linguistics skills decide the outcome of elections! Her husband’s major contenders for the presidency were Ibrahim Shekarau of All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), Nuhu Ribadu of ACN and Muhammadu Buhari the perennial candidate, this time on the platform of his new Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). In the end, it was a straight battle between Buhari and Jonathan, and given the regional and political realities, Jonathan’s victory was inevitable. Shekarau’s and Ribadu’s ambitions were probably premature-they stood a better chance in future, and as for Buhari, signs are that 2015 may yet be another try! In the end, Jonathan defined 2011! His defeat of Atiku Abubakar in the PDP primaries and victory in the general elections were unprecedented in Nigerian political calculations! But after taking power, Jonathan became (or rather remained) tentative and seemingly unsure of himself. His response to terrorism was downright confounding and he often appeared unwilling or unable to project the power of his office. His style emboldened his adversaries-disgruntled regional politicians, “Boko Haram” and its sponsors, political opponents and even civil society activists who often made him an object of derision on facebook and other social media. Even Jonathan’s supporters were often exasperated by his style! Interestingly he appeared to end 2011 finally attempting to project strength-declaring a state of emergency in fifteen local governments across four states (Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger) affected by fundamentalist terror, and deregulating the downstream petroleum sector in spite of popular opposition.

Reflections on Faith and Society

It would be insincere to hope that Nigerian Christians had a “merry Christmas” on Sunday December 25, 2011, the day having been “celebrated” with bomb attacks on St Theresa’s Catholic Church, Madalla near Suleija in which scores of innocent worshippers were killed, courtesy of “Boko Haram”. In Jos, the terrorist Islamic fundamentalist organisation which seeks implementation of Sharia all over Nigeria also attacked a Mountain of Fire and Miracles (MFM) Church with gunmen shooting at departing worshippers and detonating improvised explosive devices. Last Christmas Boko Haram exploded bombs at several Churches in Jos, and in 2009, Farouk Abdul Muttalab chose Christmas day to attempt to blow up a US airline. I know the politically correct thing to say-that Boko Haram does not represent Islam; that this is not about religion or even politics, but unemployment and poverty. However as Boko Haram’s murderous campaign develops, those positions become less tenable. Boko Haram’s demand is for an Islamic state; all their attacks are directed against two institutions-the Nigerian secular government which it seeks to overthrow, including security agencies which sustain and protect the state; and Churches and Christians. As Senate President David Mark recently pointed out, the silence of Northern and Muslim leaders in the face of Islamist terror is deafening in its implications-either cowardice or complicity!!! Faith, Society and the Law I doubt if there is any legal system without roots in moral and/or religious principles. Most of the ideas that constituted the underpinnings of Western legal systems, which we inherited through British colonialism, have their foundations in Christian and Biblical moral principles and injunctions-the Ten Commandments (thou shall not kill; thou shall not steal; thou shall not bear false witness against thy neighbour; thou shall not covet thy neighbour’s house etc). These principles were further developed in more detailed laws and injunctions in the Book of Leviticus. Western societies learnt, correctly in my view, of the necessity of codifying these principles into a secular body of law rather than rely directly on the Bible or Canon Law in other that the law may develop and cope with the complexity of modern society. The Islamic Sharia seeks total reliance on the Quran, Sunnah and other principles of their faith and practices of their Prophet, so Islamic law is explicitly religious law. Traditional African society was governed on the basis of traditional religion. In Yoruba societies for instance, all the laws enforced by the Oba, his Chiefs, the Ogboni and other institutions of Yoruba society drew inspiration from Ifa. If there was doubt about how to proceed concerning any matter of state, the Oba and his Chiefs would summon an Ifa diviner to seek direction. When an adherent of Ifa such as Professor Wole Soyinka appears to support homosexual relations as a private matter between two adults, he may in fact not have support in Yoruba religion, history and culture. I have no doubt that if two men were found having anal sex in Yoruba society of old, their actions would have been regarded as an abomination and they may have been summarily executed! Is it possible to have a legal system or society that abandons all moral and spiritual underpinnings? I don’t think so! As the West may already be finding out (without yet understanding or acknowledging it) what you’ll get is a dysfunctional society in which bankers bring down the global economy through greed and recklessness; where politics becomes dysfunctional (such as US Republicans and Democrats unable to agree on anything); where suicide rates rise as humans have no hope and no moral imperative to confront the challenges of life; where family life breaks down almost completely; and where British youths loot shops and supermarkets for sneakers and designer cloths! It is moral underpinnings that provide restraints on human behaviour. When you remove them, life itself and society-politics, economy and social relations will eventually become dysfunctional. Amoral societies are a slippery slope!!! CAN and Its Adversaries There was a report on internet news portals that Professor Jubril Aminu, a former Executive Secretary of the National Universities Commission (NUC); former university Vice Chancellor; former Minister for Education; former Minister for Petroleum Resources; former Ambassador; and until recently a Senator of the Federal Republic canvassed the banning of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) at the recent Northern Peace Conference in Kaduna! For some inexplicable reasons, this report did not show up in any of the mainstream media, possibly indicating that someone somewhere recognised the implication of the statement and tried to keep it out of circulation. I have waited for a denial from Aminu and/or the organisers of the conference, but none has been forthcoming so one must presume that he indeed made the comment. Which calls to question much about the quality of his thinking; his level of parochialism and prejudice; and is quite scary as it gives an uncomfortable peep into the mind of a man who occupied so many strategic positions in Nigeria. It also confirms that CAN is doing something right!!! Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor appears to have brought some insight, vigour and courage into the leadership of Nigeria’s Christians and clearly some ethnic and religious hegemonists are now quite uncomfortable. All I can say to CAN and Pastor Oritsejafor is, be vigilant, but keep doing what you’re doing!!!

Ojukwu and Nigerian Federalism (2)

The January 1966 coup was led by five majors-Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Wole Ademoyega, Chris Anuforo and Don Okafor, though there were three other majors (Humphrey Chukwuka, Tim Onwuategwu, John Obienu); five captains (Ben Gbulie, Nwobosi, Oji, Ude and Adeleke); four lieutenants (Ezedigbo, Okaka, Oguchi and Oyewole) and seven 2-Lietenants involved. Overall leadership and conceptualisation may be attributed to Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna. Nzeogwu was a first-class, Sandhurst-trained soldier, a radical, courageous, anti-colonial and revolutionary officer who had become disillusioned with the direction of the emerging Nigerian nation, and a nationalist and patriot, who appeared incapable of tribalism and other parochial thinking. Ifeajuna had revolutionary ideas, but was a less-predictable person. I accept Obasanjo’s depiction of him in “Nzeogwu” as a “courageous coward” who had been involved in rebellion in secondary school and university, but always managed to escape punishment. In my judgment, Ifeajuna was as much a soldier as a politician! Nzeogwu may have made an error of judgment (though Ifeajuna’s strategic position as Brigade Major in Lagos was a valuable asset to the plotters) in choosing Ifeajuna as his main collaborator. This would eventually lead to the failure of the Majors’ coup attempt. Many of the predominantly Igbo officers involved in the coup were clearly angry over seeming designs for Northern hegemony over Nigeria and particularly the introduction of tribalism, nepotism, favouritism, cronyism and general lowering of standards (to the benefit of Northern officers and men) in the army. I would say however that there were two naïve idealists-Nzeogwu and Ademoyega (who Gbulie described as a “Yoruba intellectual” who studied history in university and drove a fast sports car in his book “Nigeria’s Five Majors”) amongst the five majors. Gbulie in particular revealed the mindset of the Igbo core-disgruntlement directed mainly at the North’s blatant attempts to take over the nation and army; but also at senior Yoruba officers like Brigadier S. L Ademulegun and Colonel R.A Shodeinde who they regarded as “tribalists”. It is not improbable that ethnic and tribal sentiments, as well as Nzeogwu’s single-mindedness and dedication accounted for success of the plotters in eliminating their Hausa/Fulani targets in Kaduna and Lagos while Ifeajuna and cohorts failed to eliminate Igbo targets such as Army GOC General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Eastern Premier Dr Okpara and Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. At the end of the coup, the prime minister, Tafawa Balewa, Northern Premier Ahmadu Bello; and Northern officers-Brigadier Maimalari, Colonel Kur Mohammed, Lt.Colonels Abogo Largema, and Yakubu Pam had been killed. The largely politically illegitimate Western Premier S.L.A Akintola, Ademulegun and Shodeinde were also killed. All Igbo political and military targets had somehow escaped except for Lt.Colonel Arthur Unegbe. It wasn’t long before the coup was transformed in the minds particularly of Northerners into an Igbo attempt to wipe away their political and military leaders and the counter-coup of July 1966 which brought Yakubu Gowon (and the North) back to power became inevitable. Where was Ojukwu in all of these? Lt. Col Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu then, Brigade Commander in Kano was never consulted by the plotters probably because they saw him as a pro-establishment officer who was unlikely to sympathise with their plans, and because he was senior to all the coup plotters. There is no dispute over the fact that as the actual coup unfolded, Ojukwu absolutely refused to cooperate with Nzeogwu in Kaduna and the other plotters. Rather he rallied and kept his troops loyal to the federal government. He also protected Northern citizens including his friend, Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero during the period of uncertainty after the coup attempt. Indeed Ojukwu’s appointment as military governor of the Eastern Region was a clear acknowledgment of his loyalty to the nation and army authorities. It is indeed an irony that it was this same pro-establishment, nationalist and loyalist officer who would soon lead the Biafran rebellion against Nigeria! It is clear that circumstances thrust this role upon Ojukwu and he merely accepted the role history had earmarked for him. In summary the January 1966 coup was not explicitly an Igbo coup, but it was clearly Igbo-dominated. While certain of the plotters clearly did not have an ethnic agenda (Nzeogwu and the Yoruba participants-Ademoyega, Adeleke, Oyewole and 2nd Lieutenant Olafimihan), ethnic sensibilities may have lurked consciously or sub-consciously in the minds of many of the participants and those sentiments may have ultimately subverted the coup and cast it in a negative or dubious light. The counter-coup of July 1966 was predictable in this context, although it must also be pointed out that anger at Northern hegemonic designs appeared supported by evidence of NPC actions to sustain an illegitimate government in the West; take over the army officer corps; suppress the Tiv riots; and to dominate the rest of the country. While it is debatable whether or not the January 1966 coup was Igbo, there was no doubt about the July version-it was Northern revenge for the killing of their politicians and soldiers. But the Northern response would not stop at killing soldiers and politicians! Worse was soon to follow!!! *The historical accounts presented are based on my personal reading of virtually all existing literature on the 1966 coups, the civil war, Nigerian history and political economy and military history. All judgments and interpretations are mine.

The Case For and Against Tolling

I have been thinking about road tolling a lot in recent days! I live in the Lekki corridor where the Lagos State Government (LASG) and its concessionaire-Lekki Concession Company (LCC), have announced that tolling will commence at the Admiralty Circle Toll Plaza on December 18. I am naturally not looking forward to that date!!! Tolling is not new in Nigeria-we had toll gates on the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway and other highways across the country years ago, until ex-President Obasanjo ordered their demolition! But those were inter-city highways through which commuters did not pass daily. Come to think of it, if toll plazas were re-erected on the Lagos-Ibadan or Lagos-Abeokuta expressways today, many Nigerians who live in Mowe, Ofada, Sango-Ota and other communities, and work in Lagos will pass daily through those toll gates. We have toll plazas on the international-domestic airport link road, but there are alternatives so no one is compelled to use the tolled road. I also recall some short link road somewhere around Oba Akran/Agege Expressway where tolls were collected by a local government in the 1990s, but again there were alternatives. The prospect of imminent tolling on the fast-expanding Lekki-Epe expressway corridor, in which numerous residential communities abound has raised passions in the area amongst residents and indigenous communities, such that the Lagos State Government had to suspend its earlier scheduled commencement almost exactly a year ago, in order for enhanced stakeholder communication and the completion of alternative routes. In spite of the one year delay (at a cost of N1.05billion in 2010 and N4billion in 2011 to the state treasury) some stakeholders remain unconvinced about tolling or fencing on the road. Emotions are perhaps understandably high, with opponents arguing that provision of roads and other infrastructure is government’s constitutional obligation; placing critical infrastructure in the hand of the private sector exposes citizens to the vagaries of the market place; tolling in Lekki is discriminatory since residents in wealthier neighbourhoods in Ikoyi and Victoria-Island do not pay road tolls. Others believe that proposed tolls are unduly high; tolling and fencing are a breach of citizens’ freedom of movement etc. More substantively is the need for an alternative road; tolling when only 6 kilometres of the road had been completed; and insufficient transparency around the contract with LCC. I do not support some of these arguments. Public private partnerships (PPPs-agreements between the public and private sectors with the purpose of delivering projects or services traditionally provided by the public sector) are a necessity in the face of financing constraints as governments all over the world seek to provide infrastructure to their citizens. PPPs foster faster delivery of much-needed road infrastructure; more cost-efficient design, construction and operation of road schemes; involve risk-sharing and transfer between the public and private sectors, along with leveraging private finance, enterprise, innovation and efficiency; and bring higher service quality and standards into public sector projects and services. According to a document, “Toll Collection Technology and Best Practices”, (Persad, Walton & Hussain) of the Center for Transportation Research, University of Texas at Austin, “road pricing is becoming a more appealing means of funding transportation since revenues from federal and state gas taxes have not kept up with growth in demand for infrastructure. Moreover toll financing allows projects to be built sooner instead of waiting for tax revenues to accumulate”. Tolling may also be a demand management strategy, encouraging car pooling and use of public transportation. The authors also note that “roadway tolling is expected to become more pervasive over time.” With the size, length and rate of expansion of the Lekki corridor, waiting for government to find the resources to expand and modernise the road may have been an interminable wait, and arguably more discriminatory! We have seen how in the telecommunications sector for instance, private capital sped up the delivery of infrastructure and services perhaps by decades over the rate of government provision! It is easy to forget how long we used to spend on the road before it was widened and improved-my travel time to my Broad Street office for instance (plus fuel consumption, vehicle wear-and-tear, stress etc) has been cut from one hour or more, to less than 30 minutes on average. The road is safer at night (one colleague was once shot by armed robbers right at the Lekki Phase 1 estate roundabout! The most tangible complaints based on my review of international best practices on tolling were the absence of an alternative road and perhaps insufficient transparency and communication with stakeholders. I believe these may have been due to initial learning curves. Fortunately the state government has developed a full infrastructure for PPPs-a law, an office and a procurement process and strategy that will mitigate such complaints. The development of infrastructure in Lagos is dependent on PPPs-power, rail, BRT, ferry services, Lekki Free Trade Zone, airport, seaport etc. LASG and LCC have now provided routes by-passing the toll plaza such that when you do not wish to pay the toll, you may veer off and return after the toll plaza. I would encourage LASG and LCC to engage in intense stakeholder and community engagement to address citizen concerns. However given the critical role of PPPs in infrastructural development in Lagos, I do not believe it is wise to allow this concession to fail.

Ojukwu and Nigerian Federalism (1)

Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu’s father, Sir Louis Phillipe Odumegwu-Ojukwu was one of Nigeria’s richest men of the pre-independence era. Born in 1908, before amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, Sir Louis aged 5, followed village womenfolk to the Nkwo market place, where a small unit of British soldiers led by a Major tied the hands of Sir Louis’ father and other clan chiefs with ropes, broke their dane guns into pieces and set them on fire! This was part of British pacification and humiliation of natives into accepting colonial rule. Sir Louis subsequently got some limited education, became a produce inspector in Lagos, worked for John Holt and then entered business, becoming owner of the country’s largest road haulage company. He died in 1966. Emeka was Sir Louis’ first son, born in Zungeru on November 4, 1933 after his parents’ separation. He started living with his father in Lagos at age 3, attended St. Patrick’s School, CMS Grammar School, and at 10 in 1944 entered Kings College, Lagos. In 1946, Emeka was transferred to Epsom College, Surrey, England where he stayed six years excelling in sports-sprinting, rugby, javelin and discus-gaining admission to Lincoln College, Oxford in 1952. He took BA from Oxford in 1955 and MA both in History having lived a multimillionaire’s son’s life, driving a Rolls Royce, enjoying feminine company, and spending pleasant vacations in Lagos high society. Contrary to Sir Louis’ desire that he join the family business, Ojukwu chose to join the Civil Service, seeking a posting to Northern Nigeria. Due to Nigeria’s federal structure, he was posted instead in 1955 to his native Eastern Region, to Udi as an Assistant District Officer. Udi transformed Ojukwu into an authentic Igbo man! Before then he was a black British gentleman and Lagos boy, who spoke Queens English and fluent Yoruba. According to his friend and biographer, Frederick Forsyth, Ojukwu for the first time, found the land of his ancestors, “I became aware that I was Igbo, and a Nigerian, and an African, and a black man. In that order. And I determined to be proud of all four. In that order.” At Udi, he learnt Igbo language, forsook routine office paperwork in favour of working with villagers and peasants, and learnt the true nature of the African reality. As would later happen with other Igbos, the Udi villagers trusted him and he transcended official colonial administrator, becoming adjudicator and leader. He was subsequently posted to Umuahia and Aba until 1957 and might well have stayed in the civil service, but for his father’s actions. Horrified at Ojukwu’s next posting to Calabar (where he feared that an Efik woman would “capture” his son), Sir Louis deployed his connections with the Governor-General, Sir John Macpherson, who immediately cancelled the transfer. Evidently Emeka’s choice of the civil service was to craft his own destiny, rather than walk eternally in his father’s wealthy and influential shadows. Frustrated at Sir Louis’ interference in his career, he decided to join the army. There is an alternative view-that Ojukwu already had designs on political power and as a historian knew the army would be a good route to his ambitions. Frankly the evidence as we shall later see, does not completely validate that theory. Ojukwu may have stayed in the civil service, which he appeared to be enjoying and his actions during the 1966 coup are not consistent with those of a military officer seeking political power. Ojukwu at least in his early military career was a pro-establishment officer who may have seen the army as the only authentic national establishment in the midst of Nigeria’s ethnic and regional divisions. Ojukwu’s father again tried to prevent him joining the army as a cadet officer, prompting his joining as a private in 1957! It was only after British military officers recognised the futility and dysfunction of having a Masters from Oxford as a Private in the army with illiterates as contemporaries and superiors that his entry was regularised and his father’s wishes overturned. Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu went through training at Teshie in Ghana; Officer Cadet School at Eaton Hall, England from February 1958 for six months; Infantry School at Warminster; Small Arms School at Hythe returning to Nigeria’s Fifth Battalion, Kaduna in November 1958. He was deployed in 1959 to Western Cameroun to join the hunt for rebel Felix Moumi at one point discovering over one million pounds worth of various European currencies which he sent back to Army Headquarters for which he received commendation, but (in early signs of corruption) reportedly never heard of the funds again. Ojukwu was already in military service at independence in 1960 and wrote in “Because I am Involved” that he “burnt my British passport and turned my back permanently on colonialism and neo-colonialism”; promoted Captain in December 1960; was staff Officer at Army Headquarters from 1961; became Major in summer 1961 (at which point his father reconciled with him); passed Joint Services Staff Course and was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel in January 1963 when he was appointed army Quartermaster-General. In January 1966, when the first military coup happened Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu was Commander at the 5th Battalion, Kano. •This is the first in a multi-part review of the life and impact of Ojukwu on Nigeria’s history and federalism